A study of importance of air power in modern total war

giulio douhet cold war

Since the initial escalation, Hamas and other Palestinian militants launched more than 2, rockets into Israel with longer ranges than in past conflicts, and Israel conducted more than 4, air strikes on various targets in Gaza Zanotti,p.

The American Interest.

giulio douhet quotes

La Plata: Ediciones Terramar. International Security, 30 3 There are local-level politics that no amount of airpower effects, kinetic or non-kinetic, can supplant or overcome.

Douhet and mitchell

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U. Considering these facts, Mote , p. The level of national mobilization of resources on all sides of the conflict, the battlespace being contested, the scale of the armies , navies , and air forces raised through conscription , the active targeting of non-combatants and non-combatant property , the general disregard for collateral damage , and the unrestricted aims of the belligerents marked total war on an unprecedented and unsurpassed, multicontinental scale. Retired US Army Gen. Retrieved October 10, , from www. Noncombatants were legitimate targets. What we usually think of as war is a specific phenomenon that took shape in Europe between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, closely linked to the evolution of the modern state, and has experienced several changes since then. For instance, during the Vietnam War, the State Department regularly informed North Vietnamese leadership what targets were going to be bombed by the US military so as to avoid civilian casualties.

These threats include states using asymmetrical tactics and nonstate actors conforming transnational terrorism organizations, creating a wide range of security challenges that air supremacy must counter through adaptation and innovation.

Based on these circumstances, over the past years Israel has conducted several military campaigns like Operations Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge among others, in order to disrupt and deter Gaza-based militant groups including Hamas.

douhet theory of air power

According to Cohen and Scheinmann : Despite Israel's clear technological edge, air superiority and notable intelligence capacity, it could not accomplish all of its objectives through air power alone.

Only those factories which were useful for war production were moved because of the total war commitment of the Soviet government. These advantages reflected a military supremacy in traditional wars between states, evidenced in the international system.


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Why Airpower Needs Landpower